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“You Have the Data” . . . The Writ of Habeas Data and Other
Data Protection Rights: Is the United States Falling Behind?
SARAH L. LODE*
INTRODUCTION
Amidst a global trend of protecting individuals from unnecessary invasions of
privacy and in a world culture where nations are finding more innate rights of privacy
than ever before, 1 is the United States trailing in the protection of its citizens’
personal data? When looking at changing legislation and constitutions across the
globe, it is hard not to conclude that the United States could learn a thing or two in
the way of personal data protection: specifically, how to better protect personal
medical records, treatment data, and other health-related information.
American citizens are given seemingly little or no control over the use,
dissemination, and storage of their personal data—this is especially apparent when
United States’ legal footwork is compared with several other parts of the world. 2
Although the United States enacted the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) (which was passed in 1996 and is rarely updated) to
provide some protection of medical data, 3 along with several other topical data
protection statutes and acts, the United States’ ad hoc approach does little to protect
citizens’ personal data, which is becoming the norm in other parts of the world. 4
Internationally, citizens are provided, and sometimes constitutionally guaranteed,
avenues to challenge the use, collection, and storage of their personal data by
governmental and private agencies alike. 5 Other world citizens have access to a

* J.D. Candidate 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.S., Business
Administration, and A.A.S., Legal Studies, 2015, Ferris State University. I would like to
express my sincere appreciation to Professor Joseph Hoffmann for his feedback, guidance,
and advice during the seminar for which this Note was originally drafted. Additionally, I
would like to thank Executive Online Editor Alexis Daniel and all the Indiana Law Journal
Online Editors for their hard and thoughtful work during the publication process.
1. See generally Hillary B. Farber & Marvin J. Nodiff, Protecting Homeowners' Privacy
Rights in the Age of Drones: The Role of Community Associations, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 623
(2017); Yvonne Lindgren, The Doctor Requirement: Griswold, Privacy, and At-Home
Reproductive Care, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 341 (2017); Margaret Byrne Sedgewick, Note,
Transborder Data Privacy as Trade, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1513 (2017).
2. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); Jordan
D. Brougher, Note, The Right to Be Forgotten: Applying European Privacy Law to American
Electronic Health Records, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 510, 532 (2016).
3. See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. HIPAA provides downstream protections
for medical information, allowing the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services to sue medical providers for inappropriately disseminating personal medical data.
Federal HIPAA does not provide private citizens the right to challenge the collection or
dissemination of their own data. HHS HIPAA Enforcement Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164
(2006).
4. GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY 2015, 208 (Rosemary
P. Jay & Hunton & Williams, eds., Law Business Research 3d ed. 2014).
5. See, e.g., Andrés Guadamuz, Habeas Data: The Latin-American Response to Data
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variety of rights and writs that allow an individual to control the use, distribution,
and storage of his personal information. These rights include the writ of habeas data, 6
the right to be forgotten, 7 the right to erasure, the right to stop processing, and the
right to access. 8
With the goal of further understanding the changing international climate
regarding personal data protection, this Note will not only discuss the past and
current laws in several countries and regions—specifically Latin American countries
and the European Union—but will attempt to harmonize these changing international
data protection norms in a way that could allow the United States to build its own
comprehensive data protection scheme. While the international trend towards more
personal data protection covers a wide variety of personal data, this Note will focus
predominately on the protection of personal medical records as a case study and
starting point from which to propose a more comprehensive solution for reforming
United States legislation. 9
In Part I of this Note, I will discuss the writ of habeas data that has been developed
primarily, but not exclusively, in Latin American countries. I will discuss the
intricacies of the writ, how it evolved, and how it is applied today. Using Argentina
as an example, I will discuss how the writ would be used by an Argentine citizen to
protect her personal data. Part II summarizes the previously employed data protection
scheme in the European Union, the Data Protection Directive (“the Directive”), and
will also discuss the new EU data protection regulation, the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), which became effective in May of 2018. I will discuss how the
old Data Protection Directive is different from the GDPR, and how the rights given
to EU Member citizens differ under each. I will cover the right to access, the right to
stop processing, and the right to erasure, which are all provided within the new
regulation (although previously alluded to in the Directive). I will provide an
example of an EU Member citizen’s use of the rights provided under the GDPR.
The next two Parts of this Note will shift focus to U.S. legislation. Part III of this
Note delves into the United States’ ad hoc approach to data protection, discussing
several piecemeal regulations within the United States, and what type of rights those
regulations provide to everyday citizens. The focus of this Part is primarily HIPAA,
but other ad hoc regulations are discussed. Finally, Part IV will propose suggestions

Protection, J. OF INFO. L. & TECH., June 2000, at 8.
6. See, e.g., Marc-Tizoc González, Habeas Data: Comparative Constitutional
Interventions from Latin America Against Neoliberal States of Insecurity and Surveillance, 90
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641 (2015); Maxim Gakh, Note, Argentina's Protection of Personal Data:
Initiation and Response, 2 I/S J.L. & POL’Y 781 (2006).
7. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FACTSHEET ON THE “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN”
RULING (C 131/12).
8. See, e.g., Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Procession of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General
Data Protection Regulations), arts. 15–18, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 43–45 (EU) [hereinafter,
GDPR].
9. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.);
Brougher, supra note 2.
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for the United States to learn from changing and growing international regulatory
norms. In this Part, I will discuss the possible sources of authority for Congress to
pass a comprehensive legislative scheme regarding personal data protection, as well
as the authority to amend already existing legislation to expand personal rights for
data protection. Lastly, I will discuss a possible expansion of the writ of habeas
corpus by the judiciary to include personal data.
I.

LATIN AMERICA’S TAKE ON DATA PROTECTION: THE WRIT OF
HABEAS DATA

The writ of habeas data is a constitutional right available to citizens of certain
Latin American countries that provides citizens the right to access personal
information collected by the government or a private entity and to challenge or
correct the data. 10 The overarching purpose of the writ of habeas data is to protect
citizens from the improper use of collected personal data held by the government and
private agencies. 11 The writ does not specify what type of data it protects, and in turn,
it is used to protect citizens from the procurement and use of all kinds of personal
data, 12 such as personal medical records.
The writ of habeas data is one of many constitutionally-based individual
complaints throughout the world. 13 In the United States, the writ of mandamus is
used to compel a government official to comply with a law or court order, 14 while
the writ of habeas corpus is commonly used to require a public official to prove a
valid reason for personal physical detention. 15 The writ of habeas corpus in the
United States takes on two forms. Its statutory form is used to look behind the face
of a criminal conviction to determine if the defendant has been detained in violation
of the Constitution. 16 On the other hand, the common law writ of habeas corpus is
used whenever someone is detained by the authorities in cases that are not criminal,
and the writ is again used to determine whether the detention is valid. 17 The common
law writ of habeas corpus can be traced back to the Magna Carta and is still used
today in situations where statutory habeas corpus does not apply. 18 These
individualized writs and private rights of action are not limited to the United States. 19

10. Gonzalez, supra note 6, at 642; see also Gakh, supra note 6, at 781.
11. See Nicola Carah Menaldo, ¿Viva La Data Protection? Chile As a Touchstone for the
Future of Information Privacy, 18 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 137, 156–57 (2011).
12. Id. at 156.
13. Guadamuz, supra note 5, at 8.
14. See Developments in the Law—Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials,
70 HARV. L. REV. 827 (1957).
15. See Note, The Freedom Writ—The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61
HARV. L. REV. 657 (1948).
16. See Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP.
CT. REV. 65, 69 (1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
17. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Retroactivity and the Great Writ: How Congress Should
Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 BYU L. REV. 183, 183 (1990).
18. See id.; Christopher Ogolla, Non-Criminal Habeas Corpus for Quarantine and
Isolation Detainees: Serving the Private Right or Violating Public Policy?, 14.1 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 135 (2011).
19. Guadamuz, supra note 5, at 8.
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For example, the writ of amparo exists in the Philippines, a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, 20 and the writ of
respondeat superior exists in Taiwan, a remedy that makes a superior liable for the
acts of the subordinates. 21
The writ of habeas data was developed as a means for recovering from the turmoil
that was suffered in Latin American countries at the hands of strict military
regimes. 22 Habeas data roughly translates to “you have the data,” and was originally
created to assist family members looking for their missing loved ones
(desaparecidos). 23 Although the writ of habeas data was originally created to assist
those who suffered the effects of forced disappearances and extrajudicial executions,
a constitutional writ of habeas data has been enacted in many Latin American
countries and is available to any citizen within the countries that have enacted it. 24
The concept behind the writ of habeas data may have been born from the German
constitutional right to information self-determination created by the German
Constitutional Tribunal. 25 This historic German right allowed its citizens to “know
what type of data is stored on manual and automatic databases about an individual.” 26
The alleged direct predecessor to the writ of habeas data, which attempted to provide
citizens with a private right to action regarding the misuse of their personal data, was
developed during the Council of Europe’s 108th Convention on Data Protection of
1981. 27 Whatever the origin of the writ may be, in 1988, Brazil was the first country
to include the writ of habeas data in its constitution. 28 Several other countries quickly
followed: Columbia in 1991, Paraguay in 1992, Peru in 1993, Argentina in 1994,
Bolivia in 1995, Ecuador in 1996, Venezuela in 1999, and the Philippines in 2008. 29

20. See Atty.Fred, Writ of Amparo: Questions and Answers, JLP-LAW BLOG (Sept. 27,
2007), http://jlp-law.com/blog/writ-of-amparo-questions-and-answers/
[https://perma.cc /7H32-3E8D].
21. See Atty.Fred, The Writ of Habeas Data (By Chief Justice Reynato Puno), JLP-LAW
BLOG (Feb. 23, 2008), https://jlp-law.com/blog/writ-of-habeas-data-by-chief-justice-reynatopuno/ [https://perma.cc/6ZGD-ZSLA].
22. González, supra note 6, at 642.
23. Alvin Claridades, Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data, ATTY. ALVIN CLARIDADES
(Nov. 10, 2016), https://attyalvinclaridades.wordpress.com/2016/11/10/writs-of-amparo-andhabeas-data/ [https://perma.cc/9JS6-YDCU].
24. INQUIRER RESEARCH, IN THE KNOW: Writ of Habeas Data, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER
(Nov. 8, 2016, 1:34 AM), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/842020/in-the-know-writ-of-habeasdata [https://perma.cc/MD3S-CFD8].
25. Guadamuz, supra note 5, at 8.
26. Id.
27. Claridades, supra note 23.
28. IAPP, Will the New Year Bring New Privacy Laws to Brazil? (Jan. 28, 2014),
https://iapp.org/news/a/will-the-new-year-bring-new-privacy-laws-to-brazil/#
[https://perma.cc/AG5X-RKSM].
29. See Andrés Guadamuz, Habeas Data vs. the European Data Protection Directive, J.
OF INFO. L. & TECH., Nov. 2000; Manuel Martinez-Herrera, From Habeas Data Action to
Omnibus Data Protection: The Latin American Privacy (R)Evolution, WHITE & CASE (Sept.
2011), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/habeas-data-action-omnibus
-data-protection-latin-american-privacy-revolution
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A. Filing a Writ of Habeas Data
Although the requirements for filing a writ of habeas data vary depending on
which constitution the writ is found, the Argentine constitutional writ (and statutory
explanations) will be used in this Note to exemplify how, generally, filing a habeas
data petition works in the countries where it is available. The Argentine writ of
habeas data can be found in Article 43 of the 1994 Argentine Constitution, which
establishes the specifics for bringing a habeas data action. 30 In relevant part, the
Argentine Constitution states:
Any person may commence [a writ of habeas data] action to obtain personal
information stored in public as well as private registries and databases and to
inquire into the purpose of keeping such files. If there is any falsehood or
discrimination, the claimant may demand the suppression, rectification,
confidentiality, or updating of the data. There shall be no violation of the
secrecy of newspaper sources. 31
The Supreme Court of Argentina has held that “a writ of habeas data could secure
personal data in the possession of the national security forces, even if the disclosures
of that information [might] affect security, national defense, foreign relations, or a
criminal investigation.” 32 The scope and use of habeas data is broad and somewhat
ambiguous under both the Argentine Constitution 33 and subsequent judicial
interpretations; 34 because of this, the Argentine legislature went on to clarify further
what a claim seeking habeas data relief must include. 35
In 2000, the Argentine legislature passed the Law for the Protection of Personal
Data (LPPD), which includes forty-eight total sections, but only the last section
discusses habeas data actions. 36 The LPPD does not create a new cause of action for
the writ of habeas data—it simply codifies the already existing constitutional right
and lays out the necessary procedural requirements. 37 The LPPD defines what it
means to be “any person” with the ability to bring an action for the constitutional
writ of habeas data, and it clarifies what exactly a person must prove at the outset of
the cause of action to be a proper plaintiff with standing. 38 “Any person” as listed in

[https://perma.cc/TZ3Z-K62L]; INQUIRER RESEARCH, supra note 24.
30. Gakh, supra note 6, at 789.
31. Gonzalez, supra note 6, at 656 (quoting ÁNGEL R. OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAW
397 (2d ed. 2011) (translating Art. 43, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.))
32. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
33. See id. (showing the general and ambiguous language of the writ of habeas data in
Argentina).
34. Id.
35. Gakh, supra note 6, at 789.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Ley No. 25.326, 3 Oct. 2000, Proteccion de los Datos Personales, [Personal Data
Protection Act] (Arg.), translated in Argentina Personal Data Protection Act (2000), Act
25,326 (U.N. Pub. Admin. Network ed.), http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups
/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan044147.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5A8-7RY5].
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Article 43 of the 1994 Argentine Constitution is defined by the LPPD to include the
affected person and additionally, “a guardian, curator, or successor of that person.” 39
When filing a writ of habeas data, the plaintiff must identify the name and domicile
of either the data file or the register, while additionally attempting to identify the
appropriate government body when a governmental data bank is involved. 40 A writ
of habeas data may be filed against a government agency, official, or private entity. 41
Once the plaintiff meets her burden and initial showing, the burden shifts to the
defendant to either provide the plaintiff with the information or “demonstrate why
the questioned information was included in the database and the reasons it refrained
from providing the plaintiff's requested information.” 42
B. The Writ of Habeas Data and Protection of Personal Medical Records
Imagine a young woman in Argentina went to a government-run health care
facility and had a basic metabolic panel run on a blood sample—a simple yearly
checkup. When the test came back, it showed that the woman had markers for a rare
genetic disorder for which she exhibited no symptoms. The woman, through the
process of the yearly checkup, gave a governmental entity consent to test and store
her personal medical data (her genetic information and the markers for her genetic
disorder). What could she do if she found out, or even merely suspected, that the
medical data was being used and shared between the government entity and private
medical companies for testing and analysis regarding a possible cure for the genetic
disease without her consent?
Because she is an Argentine citizen, she would be afforded the constitutional writ
of habeas data. When filing the writ, she would have to identify the name and
domicile of either the data file or the register and attempt to identify the appropriate
government body and data bank. 43 The requirements of plaintiffs in habeas data
actions under the Argentine Constitution are vague and often require unknown facts,
figures, and locations of data storage. If the plaintiff in this case could meet her initial
burden, the original government health care entity that breached her rights, or is
suspected of breaching her rights, would have to either provide the plaintiff access
to its records regarding the dissemination and processing of her data, or demonstrate
why the questioned information was included in the database and provide the reasons
it refrained from providing the plaintiff's requested information. 44
Once the plaintiff received the information she requested through her writ, “[i]f
there is any falsehood or discrimination [within her data records], the claimant may
demand the suppression, rectification, confidentiality, or updating of the data.” 45 In
this case, because the information regarding the plaintiff’s genetic markers was

39. See id.
40. Gakh, supra note 6, at 789.
41. See Gonzalez, supra note 6, at 656 (quoting language from the Argentine
Constitution that “personal information [can be] stored in public as well as private registries
and databases.”) (emphasis added).
42. Gakh, supra note 6, at 781.
43. Id. at 789.
44. Id. at 789–90.
45. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 38.
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unlawfully disseminated, the ability to suppress, correct, update, or mark the
information as confidential would provide a remedy for the plaintiff to keep her
personal medical records just that, personal.
II.

THE EUROPEAN UNION’S TAKE ON DATA PROTECTION: THE DATA
PROTECTION DIRECTIVE AND THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION
REGULATION

Up until May of 2018, personal data in the European Union (EU) was protected
by the Data Protection Directive. 46 The Directive was passed by the EU in 1995 and
until recently has been the driving force for data protection throughout the twentyseven countries it affects. 47 However, in May of 2018, the EU turned the Directive
into a regulation by passing the General Data Protection Regulation. 48 Generally, a
directive is implemented to ask, or strongly suggest, that nations bring their own laws
in line with other EU Member States (for a cross-border, cohesive set of laws). 49
However, a directive is just a request and a guideline; it does not actually change any
currently enacted laws or have any binding authority. 50 On the other hand, a
regulation “automatically becomes part of the national legal system of each Member
State” and is a mandatory change in law. 51 As such, a regulation, like the GDPR, is
the most direct way for the EU to regulate the laws of its Member States. 52
Although the Directive was one of the early global attempts at personal data
protection, it “proved to be very cumbersome due to the significant discrepancies
between the interpretations [and] implementations” of each individual Member
State. 53 The GDPR is an attempt to resolve these issues by removing them
completely; the GDPR does not need to be implemented by individual Member State
legislatures at all and has the full force of law upon Member States. 54 This Part will
summarize the Directive for its historical value and effects on the protection of
personal data, and will discuss the rights that the Directive provided to citizens. Then,
this Part will analyze the changes to the EU’s laws under the GDPR and what the
changes mean for a Member’s citizen looking to challenge the use of her personal
medical data. The EU has been one of the world leaders in personal data protection,

46. GDPR Portal: Site Overview, EU GDPR.ORG, http://www.eugdpr.org/
[https://perma.cc/C2TT-NK5N].
47. See Christopher Wolf & Timothy P. Tobin, The European Union ("EU") Data
Privacy Directive, PROSKAUER, http://www.proskauerguide.com/law_
topics /28/III/:pf_printable/Template=print? [https://perma.cc/V783-7XFP]; see also
Francoise Gilbert, European Data Protection 2.0: New Compliance Requirements in Sight—
What The Proposed EU Data Protection Regulation Means for U.S. Companies, 28 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 815, 824 (2011).
48. Zack Gross, 8 Ways EU GDPR Differs From the EU Data Protection Directive,
CLOUDLOCK (May 12, 2016), https://www.cloudlock.com/blog/eu-gdpr-vs-data-protectiondirective/ [https://perma.cc/3NY7-LGXR].
49. Gilbert, supra note 47, at 823.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 824.
54. Id. at 825.
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and the analysis of the past directive and current regulation are perfect examples of
what regulating bodies, like the United States legislature and judiciary, can do to
provide their citizens with more rights to protect their own data.
A. The Data Protection Directive
The Directive was intended to create a floor of protections for personal data held
within all EU Member States. 55 It was established based on eight basic principles:
(1) data processing purpose limitation, (2) data quality, (3) data security, (4) sensitive
data protection, (5) processing transparency, (6) data transfer protection, (7)
independent data processing oversight, and (8) individual redress for violations. 56
Under the Directive, very basically, “personal data [could] not be processed without
the consent of the data subject unless processing is necessary for the performance of
a contract with the data subject or some explicit exception applies.” 57 This data
processing could also be strictly limited to the purpose originally notified to, or
agreed upon with, the data subject. 58 The Directive did not apply in two contexts:
one, when the activity was outside the scope of community law—for example,
national security and criminal law—and two, when the processing of the data was
done by a natural person in the course of a purely private and personal activity. 59
The Directive provided several definitions and, although fairly broad, started to
define the scope of the Directive’s regulatory application. 60 First, “processing of
personal data” was defined as “any operation or set of operations” that included
“collection, recording, organization, storage, adaption or alteration, retrieval,
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.” 61 Similarly,
“personal data” was defined just as broadly as “any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person.” 62 The Directive imposed liability on the
data controller for violations of its terms 63 and defined “data controller” as “the
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or
jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal
data.” 64 The broadness of the Directive’s definitions contributed to an overall lack of

55. Ryan Moshell, Note, . . . And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory
United States Amidst a Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 357, 368 (2005).
56. Id.
57. Christopher Kuner, Beyond Safe Harbor: European Data Protection Law and
Electronic Commerce, 35 INT'L L. 79, 82 (2001); see also Moshell, supra note 55, at 368.
58. Kuner, supra note 57, at 82.
59. Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European Union and
the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 182 (1999).
60. See Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. 95 (L 281) [hereinafter, Data Protection
Directive].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Kuner, supra note 57, at 82.
64. Data Protection Directive, supra note 60.
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clarity within the regulation, and one of the main problems it suffered since its
enactment—varying interpretations and implementations between Member States—
must stem from the ambiguity within the text itself. However ambiguous, the
Directive paved the way for the creation of a new right: the right to be forgotten. 65
1.

The Data Protection Directive and the Implied Right to Be Forgotten

The right to be forgotten can be found in European law as early as 1965 when it
was mentioned in a French court case through the use of the French term le droit a
l’oubli (translated as “right to be forgotten” or “right to oblivion”). 66 However, this
right to be forgotten dealt less with the digital age (as the original le droit a l’oubli
was mentioned before the rapid rise of computer technology) and more with wanting
to make personal information disappear, such as record of a criminal conviction after
a certain time period had elapsed. 67 The more current right to be forgotten, however,
applies to personal data in the age of new information and communication
technologies. 68 However, the right to be forgotten is somewhat of a misnomer: it
does not actually require that information be forgotten (simply because memory is
what is forgotten) but instead is a right to deletion and censorship. 69 An appropriate
definition of the right to be forgotten is “the right for natural persons to have
information about them deleted after a certain period of time.” 70 In 2016, the Court
of Justice for the European Union addressed the right to be forgotten in the Google
Spain case. 71
In Google Spain, referenced to the Court of Justice of the European Union by the
Spanish Court that had proceeded over the issue, several issues were decided
regarding the scope of the Directive; the relevant question to the analysis in this Note
is “whether an individual has the right to request that his or her personal data be
removed from accessibility through a search engine (the ‘right to be forgotten’).” 72
The final decision by the Court of Justice was that individuals do have the right—
when certain conditions are met—to ask search engines to remove personal
information from links that can be found in search results. 73 This right applies when
the information requested to be deleted is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or
excessive. 74 The court, however, indicated that the right to be forgotten is not

65. W. Gregory Voss & Céline Castets-Renard, Proposal for an International Taxonomy
on the Various Forms of the "Right To Be Forgotten": A Study on the Convergence of Norms,
14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 281, 284 (2016).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 285.
70. Id.
71. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 1 (stating the holding of the Google Spain
case and how it effects the EU’s enforcement of the Directive); see Voss & Castets-Renard,
supra note 65 at 285.
72. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 1.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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absolute and will be considered on a case-by-case basis, balancing the right to be
forgotten against the freedoms of expression, speech, and the media. 75
The procedure associated with the right to be forgotten (as established in Google
Spain) is rather malleable but is generally as follows: One, the individual requests
the removal of data that is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive. 76 Two, the
court determines, on a case-by-case basis, whether the individual’s right to privacy,
the individual’s role in the public, the nature of the information, and the public
interest against censorship should result in the information being “forgotten.” 77 If the
court determines that the information should be deleted, the data controller has the
obligation to notify any third party “to whom the data [has] been disclosed” that the
data is subject to deletion or censorship. 78
B. The General Data Protection Regulation
On April 14, 2016, the European Union passed the regulation currently in effect,
which has now replaced the Directive. 79 The GDPR was first created, and
subsequently passed, in response to the lack of uniformity among the Member States’
data protection guidelines (a process that started in 2012). 80 Although passed for
many reasons, the initial concerns that sparked the GDPR’s proposal were Members’
“fragmented legal environment[s] which ha[d] created legal uncertainty and uneven
protection for individuals and also unnecessary costs and administrative burdens for
businesses” to comply with multiple interpretations of the Directive. 81 The GDPR
went into full effect on May 25, 2018, and all businesses and entities within the
Member States, or who deal with citizens of the Member States, are now expected to
be in compliance with the regulation. 82
The GDPR’s aim is the same as the Directive’s in that “[t]he protection of natural
persons in relation to the processing of personal data is a fundamental right.” 83
However, the GDPR attempts to achieve that purpose with more accuracy and less
ambiguity, as it is a binding regulation and no longer simply a directive (or
suggestion) to the EU’s Member States. 84
Aside from its binding, regulatory nature, the GDPR actually proves to be
substantively very different from the Directive in several ways. A few prominent
changes are as follows: One, the territorial scope has increased so more countries,
other than EU Member States, have to comply because even companies that are not
based within Member States are required to follow the GDPR when interacting with

75. Id.
76. Id. at 5.
77. Id. at 4–5.
78. Data Protection Directive, supra note 60, at art. 12.
79. GDPR Portal: Site Overview, supra note 46.
80. David Erdos, European Union Data Protection Law and Media Expression:
Fundamentally Off Balance, 65 INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 139, 143 (2016).
81. Id. (internal quotations removed).
82. GDPR Portal: Site Overview, supra note 46.
83. GDPR, supra note 8.
84. See Gilbert, supra note 47, at 823.
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citizens of the EU. 85 Two, penalties for noncompliance have increased and can be as
high as four percent of a company’s annual global turnover. 86 Three, requirements
for consent have been strengthened, and the means by which a company can obtain
consent have been narrowed. 87 Four, a right to access has been included within the
GDPR, allowing data subjects to request access to a data controller’s information
(whether or not they have proof that the data controller has their personal information
or is misusing that personal information) to determine whether data concerning them
is being processed, where, and for what purpose. 88 Five, and rather importantly, a
right to erasure (similar to the right to be forgotten) has been directly included within
Article 17 of the GDPR. 89
1.

Challenging the Use of Personal Data through the GDPR Using the Right
to Access, the Right to Restrict Processing, and the Right to Erasure

Can I see the data you have on me? Can you cease processing the data that is
accessible to you? Can you delete the data you have stored on me? These are all
requests a data subject can now make under the GDPR. The GDPR gives rights to
data subjects for access, restriction of processing, and removal of certain types of
personal data held by data controllers. 90 The GDPR defines its terms in a similar
manner to those defined terms in the Directive. 91 “Personal data” under the GDPR
“means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person” 92 (this
is the same definition employed by the Directive). 93 “Data subject” is defined as a
natural person “who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” 94 Lastly, “data controller” under the
GDPR is defined as “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other
body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data.” 95 The right to access, the right to restriction of
processing, and the right to erasure may have been alluded to through the EU’s past
court decisions (Google Spain) and implied within the Directive, 96 but with the
GDPR, they are explicitly stated front and center.

85. GDPR Key Changes, EU GDPR.ORG, http://www.eugdpr.org/key-changes.html
[https://perma.cc/VT82-FN3J].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. GDPR, supra note 8; see supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
92. Id.
93. Data Protection Directive, supra note 60.
94. GDPR, supra note 8.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Data Protection Directive, supra note 60, at art. 12; EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
supra note 7, at 1.
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The right to access seems to be an add-on protection to the Google Spain’s version
of the right to be forgotten. The right to access specifically allows the data subject
the “right to obtain from the controller confirmation as to whether or not personal
data concerning him or her are being processed, and, where that is the case, access
to the personal data.” 97 In other words, the data subject does not need to have any
knowledge that the controller is actually storing or processing personal data of the
data subject. The purpose is to allow “individuals to access their personal data . . . so
that they are aware of and can verify the lawfulness of the processing.” 98 Data
subjects can access (1) the purpose of their personal data processing, (2) the
categories of personal data concerned, (3) the recipients to whom the personal data
has been (or will be) disclosed, (4) the estimated period of time the data will be stored
if possible, (5) the right to rectify or erase the data, (6) the right to file a complaint
with a supervisor, (7) the source of the data, and (8) the existence of an automated
decision-making process. 99 The data controller must provide this information
without charge to the data subject requesting it. 100
The right to restriction of processing allows a data subject to obtain from the
controller restriction of processing where certain circumstances are met. 101 A
restriction of processing is available when one of the following occurs: (1) the
accuracy of the data is contested, (2) the processing of the data is unlawful and the
data subject opposes the erasure of the data, (3) the controller no longer needs the
data but is required to store it for some other reason, or (4) the data subject has
properly objected to the data’s processing. 102 If one of the above circumstances is
met, the data subject can request that the data controller immediately cease
processing her data, and the data controller must comply. 103
Lastly, the right to erasure, which is also listed as the right to be forgotten, is the
right of a data subject to request that her information be removed or erased when
certain circumstances are present. 104 The right to erasure is available, according to
the GDPR, when (1) the data is no longer necessary for the purposes it was collected,
(2) the data subject withdrew proper consent (and there is no other legal grounds for
processing), (3) the data subject properly objects to the data processing, (4) the data
is unlawfully processed, (5) the data must be erased for compliance with a legal
obligation, or (6) the data was collected in relation to the offer of information society
services. 105 If one of these conditions is met, the data controller is required to
promptly delete the data, and if the data was made public by the controller, the
controller must also take reasonable steps to inform other controllers that are
processing the data that it is subject to erasure and such controllers should erase any
links, copies, or replications of that data. 106

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

GDPR, supra note 8.
Id.
Id. at art. 15.
Id.
Id. at art. 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. at art. 16.
Id.
Id.
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These three rights provided by the GDPR allow data subjects an incredible
amount of control for managing the use of their personal data. Data subjects can
merely request information regarding their personal data (the right to access), 107 or
can go a step further and request that the data controller restrict processing of their
data (the right to restriction of processing), 108 or, even further, request the data be
deleted all together (the right to erasure). 109
Although not inherently clear from the language of the GDPR, the regulation
seems to indicate that government entities would be considered a “data controller”
and that the GDPR would allow data subjects to use their private rights of action
against government and private entities alike. Because a data controller is defined, in
part, as a “public authority [or] agency,” 110 the regulation seems to allow for
challenges against the government for personal data that is stored or processed by a
government agency. If this is the case, the right to access, the right to restriction of
processing, and the right to erasure, when used against the government, is a huge and
distinct step toward private citizen control and knowledge of how their personal data
is being used.
2.

The General Data Protection Regulation and the Protection of Personal
Medical Records

Take our sample plaintiff from Part I.B of this Note—the woman with a rare
genetic disorder and results from a routine blood test—but now, she is a citizen of
Ireland (a Member State of the EU) and has attended a government run clinic. How
could she challenge the improper dissemination of her medical information? She has
three relevant rights available to her: the right to access, the right to restrict
processing, and the right to erasure. 111
Our plaintiff is able to use her right to access to obtain a free copy of information
regarding the purpose of her personal data and the recipients to whom the personal
data has been (or will be) disclosed. 112 With this information, the plaintiff is better
equipped to defend her rights to restriction of processing and erasure because she has
been informed of exactly why her data is being processed and to whom exactly it is
being shared. Unlike the Argentine plaintiff utilizing the writ of habeas data, our Irish
plaintiff need not know the location, name, or government or private entity database
storing, processing, or receiving her personal medical data.
Following the retrieval of her information by way of the right to access, the
plaintiff can either choose to exercise her right to restriction of processing or her right
to erasure. Although our plaintiff could absolutely request the deletion of her
personal medical data because it was unlawfully processed by being disseminated,
without our plaintiff’s consent, to other medical testing facilities, and therefore, falls

107. Id. at art. 15.
108. Id. at art. 17.
109. Id. at art. 16.
110. Id. at art. 1.
111. See, e.g., Data Protection Directive, supra note 60, at art. 12; EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
supra note 7, at 1.
112. GDPR, supra note 8, at art. 15.
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under one of the required circumstances to invoke the right to erasure, 113 the right to
restriction of processing would be a better option. A restriction of processing is
available when the processing of the data is unlawful, and the data subject opposes
the erasure of the data. 114 Our plaintiff may wish to keep her medical data within the
database of her health care provider (for obvious reasons of accurate medical
treatment), but she wants to stop the processing that is being done without her
consent. Our plaintiff could request not only that the original government clinic cease
processing her data, but that all other entities to whom the data was shared (which
she found out when she vindicated her right to access) also cease their processing,
whether those entities are public or private. As used in our plaintiff’s case, the rights
to access, restrict processing, and erasure explicitly stated within the GDPR would
provide a remedy for our plaintiff to keep her personal medical records just that,
personal.
III.

IS THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING THE GLOBAL PATH ON PERSONAL
DATA PROTECTION?

Times are changing in the way of personal data protection, as exemplified by the
European Union’s comprehensive past-directive and current regulation and the Latin
American writ of habeas data. 115 The EU’s past-directive and current regulation are
pioneers in the way of personal data protection. The right to be forgotten and
subsequently, the right to access, erasure, etc., are incredibly citizen-focused and give
the power to regulate personal data back to the citizens themselves, which is really
where such enforcement power should lie. The writ of habeas data is a pioneer in its
own way—it is a constitutionally enacted right to the people of the countries where
it is utilized. A constitutional right—more so than a regulation, directive, or law—
ingrains into the society the importance of the protections the right provides.
Specifically in the case of the writ of habeas data, it shows that the nation and the
people of the nation are making it a constitutional priority to protect personal data.
Although other countries have passed regulations that protect personal data, they are
not the pioneers or the forward-thinkers. Many nations have followed the example
set by the EU through the Directive, and countries providing for a writ of habeas data
have taken those measures one step farther by enshrining those protections into the
constitution. Although the EU and Latin American Countries are great examples of
government bodies attempting to rectify the lack of personal data protection in a
quickly changing technological era, they are not lone wolves in this field. 116
These are a few additional examples of government agencies taking steps to
protect personal data: Mexico governs the storage and use of personal data by way
of the comprehensive Federal Law for Protection of Personal Data in Possession of
Third Parties, which was passed in 2010, and was followed by specific regulations,
privacy notice rules, and binding self-regulation parameters, which further explained

113. Id. at art. 16.
114. Id. at art. 17.
115. See generally GDPR, supra note 8; Data Protection Directive, supra note 60; Gakh,
supra note 6; Gonzalez, supra note 6.
116. See GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, supra note 4.
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the federal law. 117 The law provides individuals with ARCO rights: the rights to
Access, Rectify, Cancel (stop processing), or Oppose data processing. 118 Similar to
Mexico, in 2012, Singapore passed a comprehensive law governing the protection of
personal data: the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA). 119 This act is working
alongside a patchwork set of individual laws (including common law) that were in
effect prior to the PDPA’s passage 120 (the type of patchwork system that is currently
available in the United States). 121 Under the PDPA, an individual has the right to
withdraw her consent in respect to the collection, use, or disclosure of her data. 122
Lastly, Switzerland has a federal law—the Federal Data Protection Act—that
regulates the relationship between individuals with corporations and the federal
authorities. 123 At the same time, Switzerland allows its states to comprehensively
regulate the relationship between individuals and state authorities. 124
What does this all mean for the global path in personal data protection? Countries,
regions, and entities alike are moving to a more comprehensive scheme of data
protection for individuals. 125 It is no surprise either. We live in a digital age, where
personal information is disseminated, reproduced, and published all the time. 126
Logically, the protection of personal information is growing in an attempt to align
with the ever-constant need for privacy. There is one other common global theme:
the right of individuals to, in some way, challenge the use, processing, production,
or dissemination of their personal data. 127 Whether it be the writ of habeas data, 128

117. GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY IN 26 JURISDICTIONS
WORLDWIDE 2014, 108 (Rosemary P. Jay & Hunton & Williams, eds., Law and Business
Research 2d ed. 2013).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 124.
120. Id.
121. GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, supra note 4, at 208.
122. GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, supra note 117, at 128.
123. GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY IN 21 JURISDICTIONS
WORLDWIDE 2013, 122 (Rosemary P. Jay & Hunton & Williams, eds., Law and Business
Research 2012).
124. Id.
125. See GDPR, supra note 8; Data Protection Directive, supra note 60; GETTING THE DEAL
THROUGH, supra note 117, at 108, 124, 128; Gakh, supra note 6; Gonzalez, supra note 6.
126. Andrew Liptak, Hackers Accessed More Personal Data from Equifax than Previously
Disclosed,
VERGE
(Feb.
11,
2018,
10:55
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/11/17001046/equifax-hack-personal-data-taxidentification-numbers-email-addresses-drivers-licenses-cybersecurity
[https://perma.cc/3SUU-WXTM] (discussing the disclosure and danger of the dissemination
of personal information from the credit rating agency Equifax); David Reid, EU Says
Facebook’s Apology ‘Not Enough’ as It Announces Personal Data Investigation, CNBC (Apr.
12, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/12/eu-says-facebooks-apology-notenough-as-it-announces-personal-data-investigation.html [https://perma.cc
/767E-5DWR] (discussing the international concerns results from an “inadvertent” and major
personal data leak from social media site, Facebook).
127. See GDPR, supra note 8; Data Protection Directive, supra note 60; Gakh, supra note
6; Gonzalez, supra note 6.
128. See, e.g., Gakh, supra note 6; Gonzalez, supra note 6.
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the right to be forgotten, 129 the right to access, the right to erasure, 130 or the right to
withdraw consent, 131 government bodies are taking notice that citizens should be in
the driver’s seat when it comes to the control of their own personal data.
A. The Current U.S. Approach to Data Protection: The Ad Hoc Approach and the
Protection of Personal Health Care Data
The United States employs a “patchwork quilt” of personal data protections.
Unlike the EU or Latin American countries, among others, the United States does
not have any laws or regulations dedicated to data protection in a general sense.
Instead, it creates and regulates data protection on an industry-by-industry basis. 132
To make matters more confusing, these data protection laws are developed both at
the federal and state levels. 133 Unfortunately, since 1973 the United States has stalled
in its conversations regarding personal data protection and data privacy. The United
States provided a backbone for privacy laws worldwide when “the U.S. Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) published the Fair Information Practice
Principles (FIPPs).” Since the passage of this report, however, the United States
progression in data privacy has become stagnant. 134
The approach the United States has taken to data protection seems to be one of
fixing specific problems in topical areas as they arise. 135 For example, the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, which amended the
Communications Act of 1934, deals with data problems and consumer information
protections related to the influx of cable television in the 1990s, 136 and the Fair Credit
Reporting Act provides privacy protection of consumer information contained in the
files of consumer reporting agencies. 137 These are not the only examples where
Congress saw a problem in a certain area of law that dealt with information privacy,
and then chose to pass a law addressing only that topical area of data protection. 138

129. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 7.
130. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 8
131. GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, supra note 117, at 124.
132. GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, supra note 4, at 208 (“The US legislative framework
for the protection of [personal data] resembles a patch-work quilt. Unlike other jurisdictions,
the US does not have a dedicated data protection law, but instead regulates primarily by
industry, on a sector-by-sector basis.”)
133. Id.
134. Bilyana Petkova, The Safeguards of Privacy Federalism, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
595, 596 (2016).
135. See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3402–3403, 3412 (2012);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–444 (1976).
136. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
138. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012); Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012); Controlling the
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM), Pub. L. No.
109-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified in scattered sections of 15 & 18 U.S.C.); Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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This ad hoc, and solely topical (either by type of data or means of transmitting that
data), approach to data regulation is a piecemeal compilation of the rights found in
the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 139 accompanied by various
federal and state laws, and common law. 140
Examples of topically-based federal data protection acts in the United States
include the Federal Trade Commission Act, 141 the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act, 142 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 143 the Controlling the
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 144 and HIPAA. 145 This
type of approach may stem from the lack of explicit constitutional requirements and
authority for the protection of personal data and privacy or, alternatively, from
citizens’ distrust in the government producing a comprehensive legislative
scheme. 146 This collage of statutory law “results from the sectoral approach having
been created backwards”—that is, “[r]ather than coming up with an overall picture
and then breaking it up into smaller pieces that mesh together, Congress has been
sporadically creating individual pieces of ad hoc legislation.” 147
When it comes to health care data regulations, HIPAA is the forerunner in the
United States. HIPAA regulates personal health information, which is defined as:
any information, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that . . . is
created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public health
authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care
clearinghouse; and . . . relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental
health or condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an
individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health
care to an individual. 148

139. Id.
140. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58; 15 U.S.C. § 1681; 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506; 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510.
141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58.
142. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
144. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713; 18 U.S.C. §1037.
145. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
146. Moshell, supra note 55, at 368.
147. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA
PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK, 60
(2010), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/2010/commercial-data-privacy-andinnovation-internet-economy-dynamic-policyframework [https://perma.cc/K9KM-WT5L].
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1171(4).
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Although HIPAA provides a generally robust set of protections and regulations
of health care data, 149 it suffers from several problems. 150 HIPAA is limited because
it does not include all custodians of health information. 151 Similarly, it uses a
downstream protection model meaning that it does not regulate the collection of
health data but regulates only the dissemination of that data. 152
However, there is one specific right—or more appropriately, lack of a right—that
warrants discussion here. The federal HIPAA provides no private right of action to
individuals whose health data is improperly handled, processed, or stored. 153 The
only person or entity that is able to bring a suit under HIPAA is the Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 154 The Secretary can assess
penalties for violations, which can include civil and criminal penalties, but the
Secretary is the only individual who has standing to enforce HIPAA rights. 155 Some
states have provided private right of actions to its citizens for breaches of state
equivalents to the federal HIPAA, 156 but this does nothing to remedy the lack, within
the statute itself, of a federal private right of action and does more to create a
disjunctive personal data protection legal atmosphere.
IV.

WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES LEARN FROM THE EXPANDING
INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION RIGHTS?

The increasing importance of international data transfer in the global economy,
when combined with a global trend toward comprehensive data protection,

149. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (delineating criminal penalties for misuse of private medical
data) (“A person who knowingly and in violation of this part—(1) uses or causes to be used a
unique health identifier; (2) obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an
individual; or (3) discloses individually identifiable health information to another person” can
be charged criminally under the Act.); see also Austin Rutherford, Byrne: Closing the Gap
Between HIPAA and Patient Privacy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 206 (2016) (“To safeguard
[private healthcare information] PHI, a covered entity or business associate must implement
reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards. Examples of these safeguards
include, respectively, training employees, encrypting information, and limiting access to
buildings where PHI is stored. HIPAA and the Privacy Rule create a floor, not a ceiling, from
which states can enact more stringent laws to protect patient privacy.”).
150. Nicolas P. Terry, Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in Health-Care Data
Protection, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 143, 161 (2017).
151. Id.
152. Id. While HIPAA also covers authorized and nonauthorized transmissions of data,
breach notification requirements, and permissive and required disclosures, those regulations
do not deal specifically with protections for individuals for personal healthcare data, and
therefore will not be discussed further in this Note. See Brougher, supra note 2, at 532; see
also Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
153. Brougher, supra note 2, at 532. See also Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
154. Brougher, supra note 2, at 532. See also Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
155. Brougher, supra note 2, at 532. See also Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
156. For example, the California HIPAA-type statutes regulate the disclosure of medical
information by providers and actions that can be brought by unlawful disclosure of patient
information. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10–16 (West 2007).
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highlights the necessity of a United States data-protection position that contributes
to, rather than detracts from, global stability. 157
As demonstrated from Parts I–III, from one end of the globe to the other, countries
have passed or are passing comprehensive personal data protection regulations and
providing their citizens with a right to do something about entities that
misappropriate their personal data. 158 The current state of U.S. data protection laws
is haphazard at best. As explained in Part III, the U.S. has approached data protection
on an ad hoc basis, facing problems with personal data protection as they arise, and
failing to pass one comprehensive data protection law. 159 Could a comprehensive
data protection regulation passed by the United States federal government do its
citizens good? Absolutely; from a citizen’s point of view, there is no contesting that
more personal data protection is a good thing in this growing technological era, but
a comprehensive regulation would face an uphill battle within the United States. The
GDPR and the rights it confers onto its citizens, if imported into U.S. law, would
raise First Amendment freedom of speech and freedom of expression concerns. The
right to be forgotten (or the right to erasure) is especially problematic because of its
censoring nature. 160 Similarly, the United States government lacks the
constitutionally-exclusive right to regulate and protect personal data—the right to
privacy isn’t even explicitly stated in the Constitution. 161
So what authority would Congress have to enact and enforce such a broad and
comprehensive act or regulation? The Commerce Clause is one possible avenue. The
Commerce Clause, found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution,
allows Congress to regulate commerce “among the several States,” commonly
referred to as interstate commerce. 162 By using the power given to Congress by the
Commerce Clause, Congress could regulate the movement of data across state lines
as commerce in data. The Commerce Clause would provide Congress, as it has in the
past, the necessary authority to pass a comprehensive legislative scheme broadly
regulating the movement of data. 163 The problem? This type of regulation could not,
necessarily, regulate the storage of data in libraries or archives because such data
may be considered purely local commerce or not within the stream of commerce at

157. Moshell, supra note 55, at 359.
158. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 8; Data Protection Directive, supra note 60; GETTING THE
DEAL THROUGH, supra note 117, at 108, 124, 128; Gahk, supra note 6; Gonzalez, supra note
6.
159. See supra Part III.
160. See, e.g., Robert Kirk Walker, Note, The Right To Be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J.
257, 274–78 (2012).
161. Moshell, supra note 55, at 373.
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. A regulation passed by Congress that allowed ordinary
citizens to challenge, and possibly require, that a search engine, news station, or database
remove, delete, or alter their information would raise serious freedom of press concerns, much
like strict defamation law limitations. “In the United States, however, the government is
constitutionally prohibited under the First Amendment from interfering with the flow of
information, except in the most compelling circumstances.” Cate, supra note 59, at 179–80.
163. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (regulating the interception of electronic communications).
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all. 164 Although the Commerce Clause could be used to allow Congress to pass a
more comprehensive data protection scheme than is currently being employed, a
statute enacted under the authority of the Commerce Clause would still fail to reach
a large sector of personal data by failing to reach data that is purely local.
Nevertheless, a comprehensive data protection scheme regulating the movement and
commerce of data would certainly be a place to start.
In addition to the Commerce Clause, Congress, with the help of the President,
may be able to enter into a treaty with another country, set of countries, or already
formed union (for example, the European Union), which would allow Congress to
enact legislation according to such a treaty comprehensively regulating private
personal data. The President could, with the consent of the Senate, enter into this
treaty under his constitutionally-enumerated power. 165 However, as briefly discussed
in Bond v. United States, 166 the scope of the treaty power in this circumstance is open
to challenge. In Bond, the Court stated that it need not consider the scope of the treaty
power because the defendant was criminally charged under a federally enacted
statute (pursuant to a treaty), and he was not charged under a self-executing treaty. 167
If Congress were to sign a treaty with the EU, applying the GDPR to the United
States, this would be a self-executing treaty because the GDPR is a regulation, not a
set of guidelines like the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”
analyzed in the Bond case. 168 However, if Congress were to enter into a non-selfexecuting treaty 169 to regulate the transfer, use, storage, and processing of personal

164. Congress is able to regulate interstate commerce by way of people, things, or
instrumentalities in the stream of commerce. This was developed through a line of cases in the
Supreme Court. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that a comprehensive
regulation prohibiting the home-growth of marijuana was within the stream of commerce
because if she did not grow it, she would have to partake in the interstate market); Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that Congress could regulate a
hotel because it impedes travel and has a substantial effect on interstate commerce); Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that a local farm who chose to make his own wheat
and abstain from the interstate market was sufficiently under the control of Congress because
aggregation of abstainers would affect interstate commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that a strike that stops product of steel at one facility, affects
the whole stream of commerce and can be regulated by Congress).
165. “[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” U.S. CONST. art. II, §
2, cl. 2.
166. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
167. Id. at 2087–94.
168. Id. at 2084–86.
169. “A self-executing treaty is a treaty that becomes judicially enforceable upon
ratification. As opposed to a [non-self-executing] treaty, which becomes judicially enforceable
through the implementation of legislation. A treaty could be identified as either self executing
or non-self executing by looking to various indicators, including statements that are made by
Congress or the Executive regarding the treaty, indeterminate language of the treaty, or if the
treaty deals with a matter within the exclusive law-making power of Congress, indicating that
Congress must create implementing legislation.” LEGAL INFO. INST., Self Executing Treaty,
CORNELL L. SCH.,
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data, Congress could enact federal legislation to meet the requirements of the treaty,
and the statutes may be subject to the same standards as used in the Bond case. The
Court in Bond stated that, absent clear intention by Congress, federal legislation
should be interpreted to uphold the federalism balance between the nation and the
states (although it should be noted that this was the standard applied to a criminal
statute, not a civil regulation). 170 Under a standard that provides deference to
Congress’s intentions to uphold a balance of federalism, a comprehensive act
regulating personal data may pass judicial muster as aiming at regulating interstate
communications, which is within the enumerated powers of Congress under the
Commerce Clause, as discussed previously, 171 and may be interpreted to be
regulating activity within the stream of commerce and therefore, be constitutional. 172
Although such a treaty and accompanying regulation may not reach purely-local
activity, it may be a more practical way to regulate data because it would require an
act of the President and Senate, instead of requiring that both houses of Congress
pass the regulation.
Another effective alternative would be for the United States common law writ of
habeas corpus to be judicially interpreted and expanded to not only cover a physical
detention, but a virtual detention as well (detention and use of personal data),
essentially creating a common law writ of habeas data. The common law writ of
habeas corpus in the United States is already used to force government officials to
provide valid reasons for noncriminal detentions. 173 Such detentions include pretrial
detention, pre-conviction detentions, 174 indeterminate detention (such as detainees in
Guantanamo Bay who have not been charged with a crime), 175 and isolation and
quarantine detention. 176 In this current era of vast technological growth and
transmission of personal data, in some respect, it may not seem a far deviation from
the purpose of common law habeas corpus for a court to find the seizure and misuse
of personal data akin to the seizure of a person’s physical body. Although it is
unlikely that the judiciary would stray from the historical roots of the writ of habeas
corpus, which dates back to the Magna Carta, 177 and expand it to cover virtual
seizures, judicial interpretation would be the most appropriate method for
incorporating a writ of habeas data into American jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding all the legal and social resistance, a comprehensive act or
judicially created writ might face before it would even get out of the starting gate, 178

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self_executing_treaty [https://perma.cc/RZ7C-73WR].
170. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083.
171. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (regulating the interception of interstate electronic
communications).
172. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
173. See The Freedom Writ, supra note 15.
174. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
175. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
176. See, e.g., Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016).
177. See Hoffmann, supra note 17, at 183; Ogolla, supra note 18.
178. The Supreme Court might expect public or legal backlash if it steps too far out of its
“case and controversy” stronghold. See Chris Schmidt, The Forgotten Backlash Against the
Warren Court, ISCOTUSNOW BLOG (Dec. 30, 2014), http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/iscotus
/forgotten-backlash-warren-court/ [https://perma.cc/PS9X-PGUE] (discussing backlash that
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Congress could take less drastic steps to fall in line with the data protections being
offered internationally. These changes could be implemented and incorporated
within the United States’ sectoral, topical, and ad hoc legislation on personal data
protection. The right to access, erasure, and restriction of processing of personal data
could be highly advantageous to work into certain, or all, topical data protection
regulations, like HIPAA. Amending federal HIPAA to include the right to access, as
found in the GDPR, and allowing citizens to file actions to retrieve personal health
information, along with information on how it is being used or shared would allow
citizens to feel more safe, informed, and in control of their personal data. 179 This type
of amendment to the Act could be modeled after the current Freedom of Information
Act legislation because it would follow similar guidelines and requirements for
requesting government information. 180
Similarly, Congress could amend certain legislative acts, specifically HIPAA, to
include a right to erasure—on a smaller and less intrusive scale than is currently
employed by the EU—when the personal health care information is subject to a
contract between the data subject and the data controller, allowing for the deletion of
voluntarily submitted data according to the contract. 181 Contracts are not subject to
the same stringent freedom of expression and freedom of speech rules, and this would
put less onus on courts to weigh the competing interests of privacy and First
Amendment freedoms, among other factors. 182 However, the social resistance would
be greater under this type of amendment because it is unlikely that a corporation, or
even a large government entity, will want to enter into contracts that may require
them, at a later date, to voluntarily give up collected data.
Another way Congress could include the right to erasure in data protection
regulation like HIPAA would be to amend the current act to include a private right
of erasure only on the occasions when the personal data has been used or processed
unlawfully. This would not run afoul of the First Amendment because unlawful
actions—in these cases, the unlawful processing of health care data (based on a

the Supreme Court has faced for “judicial law making” in the past from the public); Alison
Siegler, Rebellion: The Courts of Appeals’ Latest Anti-Booker Backlash, 82 THE UNIV. OF
CHI. L. REV. 201 (2015), https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/publication/rebellion-courtsappeals%E2%80%99-latest-anti-booker-backlash-0
[https://perma.cc/58JB-KLPE
]
(discussing the backlash the Supreme Court suffered from the federal courts of appeals after
deeming the federal sentencing guidelines “mandatory.”).
179. This would not bring about certain First Amendment concern because such an
amendment would simply allows access, not censorship in any way.
180. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) allows private citizens to request
information from the government. See 5 U.S.C. § 552. A FOIA request can be made for any
agency report, with some exception. The only requirement is that the request must be in writing
and reasonably describe the records you seek. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, How Do I Make a FOIA
Request?, FOIA.GOV, https://www.foia.gov/how-to.html [https://perma.cc/2FHS-KSZE].
FOIA requests can be agency specific and should be drafted according to each agency’s
requirements. There is no need, or requirement, to include in a FOIA request why the
information is being sought. There is often a fee that accompanies FOIA requests. PUB.
CITIZEN, How to File a FOIA Request: A Guide, https://www.citizen.org/ourwork/litigation/litigation-how-file-foia-request [https://perma.cc/WQA3-FE2P].
181. Walker, supra note 160, at 278–84.
182. Id.
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statute or regulation)—are not protected by constitutional rights. 183 The unlawful
sharing of our plaintiff’s health information could not be considered a form of
freedom of expression or speech, just like defamatory statements. 184 Although this
type of amendment would be shallower than the right to erasure that is offered under
the GDPR, it would be an initial step for Congress to introduce private rights of
action without enacting a comprehensive legislative scheme.
CONCLUSION
Although a truly comprehensive data protection scheme or a judicially enacted
writ of habeas data for the United States may be just a glimmer of hope for the future,
that does not mean that the United States must remain stagnant in the evolution of
personal data protection. Small changes can be made over time to bring the United
States’ ad hoc approach to data protection in line with the global trend of allowing
citizens’ private rights of action for misuse of their personal data, while in turn
holding entities responsible for their use, storage, and dissemination of data. While
these changes do not seem likely to occur very rapidly, they may need to. With the
enforcement date of the GDPR in the rearview mirror, the United States and its
entities and corporations could face hefty penalties for not meeting the minimum
protections standards with regards to personal data obtained from citizens of the EU’s
Member States. 185 In light of the global climate calling for more protection, a
fundamental question remains: do you know what is being done with your personal
data?

183. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 709, 720–22 (2012) (discussing why
criminal perjury is not protected by the First Amendment); Posner v. Lewis, 965 N.E.2d 949,
953 (N.Y. 2012) (discussing why blackmail is not constitutionally protected speech).
184. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (discussing the appropriate
constitutional protection for defamation claims).
185. See Steven C. Bennet, Is America Ready for the Right To Be Forgotten?, 88 N.Y. ST.
B. ASS’N J. 11 (2016).

